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Stakeholder Sentencing
Thom Brooks
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in how to provide new avenues for
incorporating a greater public voice in sentencing (see Roberts and Hough 2005; Ryberg
2010). This development is the product of a widely perceived growing crisis concerning the
lack of public confidence in sentencing decisions. One important factor is negative media
headlines that draw attention to cases that contribute to feeding a culture of sentencing
disapproval by the public where punishments are believed to be undeservedly lenient. A
second factor is the recognition that victims should have greater involvement in the criminal
justice system, including sentencing decisions. But how might we improve public confidence
and provide a greater voice for victims without sacrificing criminal justice in favour of mob
rule?
These developments concerning the relation of public opinion and punishment raise
several fundamental concerns. How much voice, if any, should the public have regarding
sentencing decisions? Which institutional frameworks should be constructed to better
incorporate public opinion without betraying our support for important penal principles and
support for justice? 
This chapter accepts the need to improve public confidence about sentencing through
improving avenues for the public to posses a greater and better informed voice about
sentencing decisions within clear parameters of justice. I will defend the idea of stakeholder
sentencing: those who have a stake in penal outcomes should determine how they are
decided. This idea supports an extension of restorative justice I will call punitive restoration
where the achievement of restoration may include a more punitive element, including
imprisonment. My argument is that the idea of stakeholder sentencing offers a compelling
view about public opinion might be better incorporated into sentencing that promotes a
coherent and unified account of how punishment might pursue multiple penal goals,
including improving public confidence in sentencing.
I. The Problem of the Public
A powerful argument against greater incorporation of public opinion in sentencing decisions
is that a larger public voice would contribute to disproportionate punishments. Justice is best
served through ensuring punishments are proportionate and not by tailoring outcomes to those
more favoured by the public.
The idea that the public might be more likely to endorse disproportionate
punishments, especially overly severe sanctions, is understood to be a compelling reason why
the criminal law has endorsed victim displacement. The concern is that punishments would
become too harsh and injustices practised if the victims determined the appropriate
punishments for their offenders. This runs together separate issues that may bear on how we
determine sentencing: the first is the voice of victims and the second is the input by the
general public. If the general public should be able to have some input on sentencing, then it
is often submitted that victims in particular should have a voice rather than remain silent.
(O’Hara 2005) 
Victims were traditionally displaced from decisions about sentencing in order to best
promote justice through a better guarantee of consistency and proportionality:
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we seem to have lost sight of the origins of the criminal law as a response to the
activities of victims, together with their families, associates and supporters. The blood
feud, the vendetta, the duel, the revenge, the lynching: for the elimination of these
modes of retaliation, more than anything else, the criminal law as we know it today
came into existence (Gardner 1998: 31).1
Victim displacement helped end the private pursuit of justice against offenders by private
citizens and promote the rule of law. We should not serve as judges in cases where we have
an interest in the outcome, for John Locke, because of the danger that victims will be ‘partial
to themselves and their friends’ at the expense of others (2004: 275). Decisions should be
impartial to secure justice. This may be best guaranteed by ensuring that those with a special
interest in sentencing decisions should not possess much influence over how these decisions
are made.
The concern that a greater public voice would contribute to overly severe sanctions is
thought to receive support from populist proposals, such as California’s so-called ‘Three
Strikes and You’re Out’ law where offenders convicted of a third strike-eligible crime face a
minimum 25 years in prison (Cullen et all, 2000; Zemring, et al 2001). These proposals have
proven counterproductive from the perspective of effective criminal justice policy. Studies
have concluded that California has benefited from at best a negligible deterrent effect of 2 per
cent or less alongside an explosion in the prison population and associated costs.2 If this is the
kind of criminal justice policy the public most wants, then it may lead to a far more expensive
system for little, if any, effect on crime reduction and improved public safety.
But must a greater public voice result only in support for overly harsh sentencing? It is
not inconceivable to imagine popular celebrities commanding wide support for a more lenient
sentence or perhaps a pardon. The core issue is not that the public might support more
punitive sentences, but that sentencing decisions may become more arbitrary and less uniform
where similar cases may be treated too differently and, thus, unfairly. The claim that the
public are more likely to endorse disproportionate punishments is a statement about the
failure of the public to properly account for proportionality more generally. This may be
explained by the fact that the public may often have an inaccurate, perhaps even irrational,
fear about crime and likely future victimhood (Cook and Lane 2009; Hutton 2005; Lai et al,
2012; Roberts et al 2003). The public is also often mistaken about the potential benefits of
more punitive penal policies (Williams 2012). If the public has inaccurate or incomplete
information about relevant factors, then it cannot be expected to arrive at any satisfactory
judgement in sentencing matters. And yet criminal justice must command public confidence
if it is to command satisfactory legitimacy and be effective. Otherwise, the public might turn
to ‘take the law into their own hands’ and undermine the rule of law.
The problem of the public is that we must secure public confidence despite the fact
that the public possesses deep epistemic problems. A greater public voice might only secure
higher confidence at the cost of abandoning evidence-based sentencing policy on how crime
reduction and other penal goals might be achieved. How might we achieve public confidence
without falling into this trap?
1 See Doak (2005) and for criticisms see Edwards (2002).
2 See Durlauf and Nagin 2011: 28 and also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. (2011).
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I believe that this trap may be avoided. We should first recognise that the issue is not
whether public opinion matters, but rather how much it should matter. This is because the
idea that the public should have a voice in sentencing is deeply entrenched in its democratic
institutions. The public indirectly exercises its voice on the criminal law through electing
political leaders that help shape the future contours of the criminal law and the criminal
justice system more generally.3 The public has a more direct voice as lay magistrates or juries.
Many countries have long established practices where the public may participate in
sentencing decisions. One example is the use of lay magistrates in the United Kingdom to
determine the punishment of less serious criminal offences (Darbyshire 2002, Grove 2003,
Roberts et al 2012). Several Continental jurisdictions allow for the sentencing of more serious
offences to be determined by lay magistrates sitting alongside professional judges.
Additionally, the use of civilian juries to determine monetary awards and offender
punishment after a conviction is secured is well established in many jurisdictions as well
(Brooks 2004a, 2004b, 2009). Juries are often used in trials concerning more serious
offences. Juries in the United States are also entrusted with determining sentences in capital
trials, including whether a convicted offender should be executed.4 Furthermore, judges are
increasingly permitted to consider victim impact statements in determining penal outcomes.
These statements are presented in court and detail how a crime has affected victims and their
relations. Victim impact statements have had an awkward reception by the courts where the
impact on victims may be relevant in sentencing, but not normally victim opinions about
sentence preferences (Brooks 2012a: 72-73).5
These examples confirm that the idea that the public should have a voice about
sentencing is widely entrenched through democratic institutions. This fact does not render the
idea uncontroversial. The issue is not whether public opinion should be less, but rather
whether it should be more. It is widely held that public confidence in the criminal justice
system is an important source of democratic legitimacy (Bennett 2013). This does not require
that every outcome receives popular approval, but rather that the overall system has
satisfactory public support. This is because citizens are governed by the rule of law rather
than the tyranny of the majority. So the lack of public confidence may represent a problem of
legitimacy concerning sentencing outcomes. 
3 This view supports the observation by Joseph Schumpeter that democracy is not rule
by the people, but rather rule by politicians elected by the citizenry (1942: 284-85).
4 See Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
5 There are exceptions for some US states where victims are permitted to offer
sentencing recommendations. On victim rights and US states, see Twist (2003) citing Ala.
Const. amend. 557; Alaska Const. art. I, Sec. 24; Ariz. Const. art. II, 2.1; Cal. Const. art. I,
12, 28; Colo. Const. art. II, 16a; Conn. Const. art. I, 8(b); Fla. Const. art. I., 16(b); Idaho
Const. art. I, 22; Ill. Const. art. I, 8.1; Ind. Const. art. I, 13(b); Kan. Const. art. 15, 15; La.
Const. art. 1, 25; Md. Decl. Of Rights art. 47; Mich. Const. art. I, 24; Miss. Const. art. 3,
26A; Mo. Const. art. I, 32; Mont. Const. art. II, sec. 28; Neb. Const. art. I, 28; Nev. Const. art.
I, 8; N.J. Const. art. I, 22; New Mex. Const. art. 2, 24; N.C. Const. art. I, 37; Ohio Const. art.
I, 10a; Okla. Const. Art. II, 34; Or. Const. art. I, sec. 42; R.I. Const. art. I, 23; S.C. Const. art.
I, sect. 24; Tenn. Const. art. I, 35; Tex. Const. art. I, 30; Utah Const. art. I, 28; Va. Const. art.
I, 8-A; Wash. Const. art. 2, 33; and Wis. Const. art. I, 9m.
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While there is no argument for reducing the public voice, it is questionable whether it
could be less than it is. Relatively few cases ever proceed to trial, perhaps no more than 5-7%
(Brooks 2004a: 201). Fewer receive decisions by juries on verdicts. Some populist policies,
such as California’s ‘Three Strikes’ law, have become enacted due to popular support. 
However, it remains unclear how close the link is between public favour and penal policy
outcomes. The public may favour more punitive sanctions, but it also supports crime
reduction which may be undermined by increasing penal severity. This gap between public
favour and public expectation is a problem for politicians trying to win both public support
and crime reduction.6
Consider attempts to address this gap in the United Kingdom. The British government
has planned to implement greater usage of community sentences and restorative justice with
tough sounding rhetoric about ‘breaking’ reoffending cycles and community ‘pay back’ in an
effort designed primarily to generate significant savings as alternatives to hard treatment and
its much higher costs (Ministry of Justice 2010, 2012a). These plans are correct to claim
public support for criminal justice measures that are effective at crime reduction, but overlook
the lack of public support for measures leading to reduced punitiveness (Dawes et al, 2011.
These plans are an example where securing public confidence has importance, but it does not
drive policy change. This case illustrates how the indirect expression of public opinion on
sentencing matters through democratic institutions does not confirm a strong link. So perhaps
a reason why there is little argument for reducing the public voice in sentencing matters is
because the public exercises relatively modest impact. 
It does not follow that the public voice should be increased to improve public
confidence and democratic legitimacy (Thomsen 2013). The most powerful criticism is that
further inclusion of public opinion may undermine just punishment. The problem is that
public disapproval about sentencing decisions is known to decrease where the public has
better information (Roberts et al 2012). One approach to improve public confidence is to
increase public knowledge: the problem is not how criminal justice is conducted, but how
little the public understands it. We require improved public education about sentencing to
overcome the present crisis of low public confidence. So judges should not tailor sentencing
decisions to better cohere with public opinion, but the public should be better educated about
how these decisions are made in order for the public to support judges and not vice versa (De
Keijser 2013). So the solution to the problem of the lack of public confidence in sentencing
decisions might be found in improved public knowledge. Our task might be to better shape
public opinion to support current sentencing decisions rather than to create a larger space for
the public voice. Improving public confidence need not require us to increase the influence of
public opinion.7 If successful, this approach might secure greater public confidence without
6 While some argue that victim impact statements might influence juries to support
harsher sentences (Myers et al, 2013), there is convincing evidence that sentencing does not
become more punitive with victim impact statements (Roberts 2009).
7 It is controversial whether or not popular decision-making is likely to lead to
unsatisfactory public policy outcomes. For a powerful counterargument, see Estlund (2008).
Furthermore, the idea that citizens should devote greater efforts to become better educated
about criminal justice matters in order to improve public confidence may rest on an idealistic
view about civic participation unlikely to be achieved (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
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sacrificing consistency and proportionality.
II. In Defence of Public Opinion
Increasing the impact of public opinion on sentencing outcomes faces several important
challenges. The first problem is that the public lacks satisfactory information to form a
justifiable judgement. The greater influence of public opinion may open the door to
disproportionate punishments based upon inaccurate or incomplete relevant knowledge. A
second problem is that sentencing decisions might become more arbitrary. Like cases may not
be treated similarly if outcomes were less under the control of professional judges and trained
lay magistrates. The third problem is that the public may be more likely to support greater
sentence severity which may undermine penal goals, such as proportionality, improving crime
reduction and offender rehabilitation. Public confidence is important in order to secure
legitimacy, but increasing the impact of public opinion on sentencing outcomes presents us
with more problems than prospects. 
Overcoming these three problems requires institutional reforms where a greater public
voice is exercised within clearly set parameters ensuring satisfactory consistency across
similar cases. It would also entail the public gaining opportunities to acquire relevant
knowledge to better inform their decisions, or what we might call the creation of an
‘ontologically thick public opinion’ (Dzur 2013). How to avoid arbitrariness while getting the
criminal law to better track public opinion?
Restorative justice helps us identify the way forward (Braithwaite 2002, Brooks
2012a: 64-85). Restorative justice is an approach that offers an alternative to the criminal
trial. Trials are adversarial and combative. In contrast, restorative justice aspires to create
mutual understanding and reconciliation between offenders, their victims and the wider
community. Criminal trials take place in courtrooms, but restorative justice is practised
through a mediated conference. While trials are thought to produce winners and losers,
restorative justice seeks to promote healing and a ‘restoration’ of damaged relationships.
The restorative justice conference often takes the form of either a meeting between the
victim and offender or in some cases inclusive of victims’ families and community
representatives. Both settings are mediated by a trained facilitator operating under a
professional body, such as the Restorative Justice Council. Offenders retain access to legal
representation, but must admit their guilt prior to participating in a conference and offenders
are expected to speak for themselves. The conference is designed to create a structured
dialogue aimed at improving understanding. A standard scenario is that the facilitator begins
by clarifying the meeting parameters. The victim next explains the impact a crime has
inflicted on her. The offender then accounts for his crimes. This usually includes an apology
to the victim. Offenders are believed to benefit from a better understanding about how their
crimes have impacted their victims and the wider community. Victims are believed to benefit
by hearing the offender apologize for his crimes in person (and not through legal counsel),
gaining greater clarity about the offender and his reasons for offending and having a voice on
the post-conference contract the offender is expected to accept.
Restorative justice is an example about how the problem of the public may be
overcome. First, there are clearly set parameters for restorative conferences that help ensure
consistency (Ormerod 2012, Restorative Justice Council 2011a). Conferences are facilitated
by trained mediators ensuring a structured dialogue where like cases are treated similarly.
Restorative conferences have the advantage of greater flexibility over the range of penal
options to best fit the specific needs of offenders. Conference participants agree contracts in
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about 98 per cent of cases (Shapland et al, 2006, Shapland et al, 2007: 27). Standard
outcomes include requirements that offenders attend treatment to overcome substance abuse
or problems with anger management, training to improve employability and life skills, and
participation in community services. These are each believed to promote the ‘restoration’ of
an offender’s public status as an equal citizen.8 If offenders fail to satisfy the terms of their
contract, then a more burdensome contract may be offered or the offender can face a possible
trial and a potential criminal record.
Secondly, members of the public that participate in restorative conferences are able to
acquire relevant knowledge to help inform their decisions about contractual outcomes.
Outcome decisions might benefit from operating with a more robust view about specific
offences within the terms of the personal and wider ‘social context’, including a more robust
account of desert (Roberts 2013). Desert is often understood within the framework of legal
moralism: punishment is justified where offenders are culpable for moral wrongdoing. The
more wrong the crime, the greater the deserved punishment. This understanding about desert
and morality has received much criticism for its potential arbitrariness and potential
incompatibility with the criminal law (Brooks 2012a: 20-26). Desert enjoys central
importance for most, if not all, sentencing guidelines. We require a more compelling account
that overcomes these problems. One alternative is ‘empirical desert’, an idea championed by
Paul Robinson that identifies ‘the community’s intuitions of justice’ discovered through
‘empirical research into those factors that drive people’s assessment of blameworthiness’
(2008: 149).9 
Restorative justice is able to provide an account consistent with empirical desert.
Conference participants work together to clarify shared intuitions about desert concerning a
specific offender. The structured setting of a restorative conference helps avoid the problem
of relying on any one contested moral view about an offender might deserve in his restorative
contract. Conference participants are also able to avoid the influence of media manipulation
concerning relevant facts through direct engagement with the offender. 
Restorative justice indicates how the problem of the public may be overcome. The
first problem is that the public lacks satisfactory information to form a justifiably informed
judgement. This is overcome through the constructive dialogue designed to generate
improved understanding between victim, offender and the community. This avoids the
concern that outcomes might be based on inaccurate or incomplete relevant knowledge. The
second problem is that sentencing decisions would become more arbitrary if the public voice
held greater weight. This problem is overcome through the structured conference setting
facilitated by a trained mediator where contracts for the offender are tailored to his particular
circumstances. The third problem is the worry that the public, if granted a greater say on
outcomes, are more likely to support greater sentence severity that may threaten other penal
goals. Instead, this has not been the case with most available studies about restorative justice
in practice (Braithwaite 2002; Doak and O’Mahoney 2006). 
Restorative justice is an approach that promotes improved public confidence while
reducing offending and at reduced costs. Both victims and offenders report high satisfaction
8 See Ashworth 2002 and Brooks 2012a: chapter 4 for doubts about whether
restorative justice achieves its aims.
9 See Robinson and Darley1997, 2007; Robinson, et al 2010 and Robinson 2013.
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with participation in restorative conferences (Sherman, et al 2008: 25-26). It might be likely
that further use of restorative conferences will contribute to continued satisfaction by future
participants. Restorative justice has also been found to contribute to 25 per cent less
reoffending than alternatives while saving £9 for every £1 spent (Shapland, et al 2008,
Restorative Justice Council 2011b).10 If we want to improve public confidence without
sacrificing crime reduction efforts and other penal goals, then restorative justice is an
approach we must take seriously.11 Restorative justice indicates how public opinion may be
brought back into criminal justice and overcome the problem of the public.
III. Sentencing by Stakeholders
Restorative justice is hamstrung by several limitations. Restorative justice can overcome
these challenges without sacrificing its attractiveness through recommended revisions that I
will indicate in this section.
The first problem concerns a fundamental question about ‘restoration’. Restorative
justice aims at the restoration of offenders, victims and the community. The idea is that
criminal offending has damaged the relationship between them. We require a process that
may help restore the shared bonds of association through constructive dialogue that will yield
a mutually satisfactory outcome for the relevant parties. The problem is identifying the
relevant community members. Some argue, such as Andrew Ashworth, that ‘the concept of
restoring the community remains shrouded in mystery, as indeed does the identification of the
relevant “community”’ (2010: 94).12 He says elsewhere:
If the broad aim is to restore the ‘communities affected by the crime’, as well as the
victim and the victim’s family, this will usually mean a geographical community; but
where an offence targets a victim because of race, religion, sexual orientation, etc.,
that will point to a different community that needs to be restored (Ashworth 2002:
583).
So the first problem is identifying the community members to be restored through restorative
justice.
A second problem with restorative justice concerns conference membership.
Restorative justice aims to restore the damaged relationship between victim, offender and the
community. Let us suppose each party is known so we do not face the first problem of not
knowing the persons to be restored. There remains problems where one or more parties are
unable or unwilling to participate in a restorative conference. In practice, these conferences
may proceed without the victim where he or she chooses not to attend. This is because, in
part, restorative justice requires the active consent of participants: none should be coerced as
this would undermine restoration. Conferences may proceed for the additional reason that
some positive conclusion may result nonetheless. Perhaps the relation between victim and
offender remains damaged, but there may be benefits still where offenders acknowledge their
10 See Latimer, Dowden and Muise (2005) on empirical studies confirming the
effectiveness of restorative justice practices in reducing reoffending.
11 See National Offender Management Service (2012).
12 See Edwards (2006).
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guilt and seek restoration with the community. The problem of who is a relevant member of
‘the community’ will remain. A related concern is in cases where the victim is murdered and
unable to participate. Conference membership has central importance as these are the parties
that need to be engaged for restoration to be achieved. It is a serious problem where we
cannot identify whose participation is required.
The third problem is limited applicability. Most proponents of restorative justice
defend the approach as alternative to imprisonment. Restorative justice as an approach to
punishment seeks to engage participants outside the courtroom through constructive dialogue
and mutual understanding that will lead to outcomes which avoid hard treatment.13 The
rejection of imprisonment by restorative justice restricts its applicability. The concern is that
the public may not support alternatives to imprisonment, such as the use of restorative
conferences, for offenders guilty of the more serious violent crimes (Kahan 1996, Khan 2011,
Spiranovic, et al 2011). The practice of restorative justice has been generally limited to cases
involving youth offenders and minor offences. Its limited applicability raises further questions
about whether it can offer a theory of punishment because it may only apply to some, but not
all or even most, cases.
These three limitations can be addressed together. The first challenge concerns the
problem of identifying the community to be restored. I believe that we should be guided by an
important principle of stakeholding: that those who have a stake in penal outcomes should
have a say in decisions about them. Stakeholding is an idea that originates in the literature
about business ethics and corporate governance (Hutton 1998; Plender 1997; Prabhaker
2004). It is meant to offer a model that improves transparency and accountability through
shared responsibility and communicative dialogue. Stakeholding has direct relevance for
sentencing policy. Stakeholders are those individuals with a stake in penal outcomes. These
persons will include victims, if any, their support networks and local community. Each marks
himself or herself out as a potential stakeholder in virtue of his or her relative stake.
Stakeholders will also include offenders because they, too, have a stake in penal outcomes.
The restorative justice conference setting is a useful model for working out how
stakeholding might take shape. Conference proceedings aim to achieve restoration though
dialogue and the offender satisfying contractual conditions that participants agree. The idea is
that the expression of apology by the offender, improved mutual understanding and
completion of specified terms yields ‘restoration’, but we might better understand this process
as promoting stakeholding. Some commentators refer to participants as ‘stakeholders’ and
there is overlap between my account of stakeholder sentencing and standard views about
restorative justice (Braithwaite 2002: 11, 50, 55). Nonetheless, the differences are crucial and
reveal how restorative justice might be transformed into a more compelling account of
punishment that better incorporates public opinion.
A focus on stakeholding clarifies who should be included in conference proceedings:
those that have a stake in penal outcomes. This will involve those directly affected, such as
13 Restorative justice is practised in different ways. My focus is on its use as a view
about punishment and not its use post-conviction. See Miler (2011) for an insightful account
about restorative justice post-conviction and McGlynn (2012) for an approach more closely
related to my defence of punitive restoration below.
Page 8
the victim and her support network.14 Stakeholders bear the costs and are most affected by
penal outcomes. Together, they should determine what these outcomes are within prescribed
limits acceptable to the general public.  
It is crucial to highlight that this focus on stakeholder decision-making does not
exclude the general public. So while it is clear that members of the public may be
stakeholders as victims and offenders, then general public is also a stakeholder. Stakeholding
is not about the expression of the general public’s judgement nor is this often possible if
thought desirable (Brooks 2012a: 10-22; Hart 1968: 161). Stakeholding is instead about
giving special attention to those who have a greater stake in outcomes. The general public
constrains the actions of stakeholder sentencing by setting the parameters for permissible
penal procedures and outcomes. So conferences are mediated by a trained facilitator to ensure
procedures are sufficiently robust and offenders are entitled to legal representation as a further
guarantee.15 Furthermore, the general public might also participate as local community
members or as members of a victim’s support network. Neither the victim, her family or
support network, the offender or others have the only say on penal outcomes. Neither does the
general public. Stakeholding is about bring these different interests together in a structured
way to determine penal outcomes.
If the general public is a relevant stakeholder, then it might be argued that it should
have a say. The problem is that this might justify mob rule whereby penal outcomes are
determined by popular vote. But not all stakeholders are similarly situated and some have a
greater stake than others. For example, victims and those directly affected by crimes and their
outcomes will have a larger stake and, thus, should be included in stakeholder conferences.
The general public should also be included, but principally through representation, such as a
few persons. So the stakeholder conference may somewhat resemble a jury in membership
size. It will remain essential that its size is relatively small to better facilitate constructive
dialogue and to keep focussed on the needs of those with the largest stakes.16 This position
broadly supports the widely used restorative conference model instead of victim-mediation
14 Other relevant stakeholders will include the offender and any support network. In
practice, restorative conferences often include friends and family of the victim and of the
offender, respectively, in 73% and 78% of cases examined in one study (Shapland, et al 2007:
20). Interestingly, the same study found that parents were far more likely to attend restorative
conferences (50% of offenders and 23% of victims) than partners (3% of offenders and 5% of
victims) (Shapland, et al 2007: 20).
15 The involvement of legal representation might suggest the need for a judge to serve
as an adjudicator. This is not current practice, but my defence of punitive
restoration—administered by a trained facilitator—is not inconsistent with the facilitator’s
role being served by a legal professional.
16 The general public has a stake in outcomes and so should exercise a voice. The
model advocated here justifies inclusion of persons serving as representatives of the general
public perhaps drawn from the local community, a common practice in restorative
conferences at present. This permits members of the general public to be included while
keeping conference membership to a size that is large enough to include persons with largest
stakes and representative membership of the general public and small enough in size to best
facilitate constructive dialogue.
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meetings.17 This is because the latter excludes community representation. The victim may
have a larger personal stake than other individuals in penal outcomes, but this does not negate
the stake held by the community. Both categories of stakeholders can be accommodated
through the restorative justice conference. This model has proven practically workable with
the additional benefit that it promotes stakeholding.
The stakeholder model broadens the applicability of the restorative conference model
to endorse what I call punitive restoration. This is the idea that penal outcomes arising from
the conference model need not always exclude imprisonment.18 While it is clear that
incarceration often makes successful crime reduction efforts more difficult, it is also clear that
prisons can and should be transformed to improve their disappointing results (Liebling 2006).
For example, restorative justice contracts often include an obligation on offenders to engage
in developing employability and life skills as well as treatment for any drug and alcohol
problems (Brooks 2012a: 66-67, 73-75).19 There is no reason to accept that these activities
could never be successfully delivered within prisons. Perhaps imprisonment should be used
sparingly. This is not an argument for never using custodial sentences. It is conceivable and
possible that a secure facility, such as a prison, may prove the best environment for some
offenders in select cases (Perez and Jennings 2012). Furthermore, prison officers might
receive additional training to become Personal Support Officers (Chapman and Smith 2011:
228). These officers have most frequent contact with imprisoned offenders and the trust that
builds over time could be put to more effective use where officers provided improved pastoral
support. There are then several ways in which the prison might be restructured in ways that
would better enable it to foster a more conducive environment for the rehabilitation and
restoration offenders than found in most prisons today. These reforms may require additional
resources, but they may prove cost-effective over time in the likely, although no means
certain, result of improved crime reduction.
The idea that we should make more effective use of prisons does not ignore evidence
that prisons often undermine offender rehabilitation. Short-term imprisonment is often linked
with high recidivism rates. This is a significant problem because most offenders receive
sentences of less than 12 months and about 60% reoffend within weeks of their release.20
There is no confirmed link between reductions in recidivisms and increased penal tariffs. In
the words of Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit: ‘there is no convincing evidence that further
increases in the use of custody would significantly reduce crime’ (Carter 2003: 15; see
17 For a brief overview of different restorative justice models, see Restorative Justice
Council, ‘RJ Models: Models of Restorative Justice’ (website:
http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/resource/rj_models/).
18 Punitive restoration is a revision of restorative justice models that does not rule out
the permissibility of incarceration under specified conditions where restoration would not be
undermined. Punitive restoration may also be commensurate with further revisions of the
mechanics of restorative justice, including improving the therapeutic potential of restorative
justice (see Doak 2011). 
19 See Towl (2006) on prison-based programmes designed to better tackle drug and
alcohol abuse.
20 See Ministry of Justice (website: http://open.justice.gov.uk/home/).
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Langan and Levin 2002: 2). The prison has been considered by some to be ‘criminogenic’
because it may contribute to more likely criminal activity post-release than if an offender had
received an alternative punishment (Tonry 2011: 138, 140-41).
The lack of reformatory efforts for those serving less than 12 months sentences is a
major contributing factor to the high recidivism.21 Brief intensive interventions have been
employed to address problems associated with drug use and offenders were found to benefit
from ‘significant gains in knowledge, attitudes, and psychosocial functioning’ (Joe et al
2012). These sessions were corrections-based treatment of moderate (30 outpatient group
sessions three days per week) or high intensity (six month residential treatment) has been
found to yield cost savings of 1.8 to 5.7 the cost of their implementation (Daley et al 2004).
Such policies indicate that prisons may be reformed to better support offender rehabilitation
and improve post-release crime reduction efforts without sacrificing cost-effectiveness.
These reforms toward punitive restoration are important. This is because it is possible
that the punishment of offenders guilty of more serious crimes may require more punitive
outcomes than currently available to most restorative justice conferences. For example,
current practice rejects the permissibility of including the threat or imposition of
imprisonment in restorative contracts. In contrast, punitive restoration might find offenders in
a position where they might agree to treatment and community service plus a suspended
sentence that could be imposed if contractual terms are not satisfied. This option would
extend the flexibility of restorative justice to address a greater range of offences in a
restorative context and bypass the need for a criminal trial.  Stakeholder sentencing can then
identify how a restorative model might be transformed and overcome the problem of limited
applicability.22
This transformation might be objected to on the grounds that imprisonment, even for a
few days, is a major curtailment of individual liberty. Such a sanction requires special
safeguards that only the courtroom can satisfy. The problem with this objection is that the
overwhelming majority of offenders, and as high as 97% in Scotland, never go to trial. Most
cases end in plea bargains with a judge or magistrate.23 If it remains acceptable for more
serious crimes to be punished after this process, the stakeholder model should be an attractive
alternative. This is because punitive restoration would have a trained facilitator not unlike a
lay magistrate conducting criminal proceedings, but with the advantages of victims gaining
the satisfaction of an apology from their offender, the promotion of greater mutual
understanding among stakeholders and penal outcomes better targeted to address the specific
needs of offenders. Perhaps it may be contended that facilitators should receive additional
training or that their role is performed by magistrates. We should also expect that, if this
extension of restoration justice can continue to earn victim satisfaction, it will build and
21 The lack of these efforts is a major contributing factor, but I do not suggest that it is
the sole or primary factor for unsatisfactory reoffending rates.
22 The UK’s Ministry of Justice has published recent proposals that aim to further
embed restorative justice within the criminal justice system includes the aim for greater usage
between conviction and sentencing (2012: 5). Punitive restoration can fulfill this aim and
provide a means for determining a greater variety of sentencing outcomes.
23 See Lippke (2011) for an authoritative critique of plea bargaining and Ashworth and
Redmayne (2005: 6-7).
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support public confidence, too (Gromet et al 2012). The stakeholder model of punitive
restoration can deliver a more satisfactory outcome for victims, offenders and the wider
community than the less transparent proceedings that often lead to plea bargaining.
It might be objected that punitive restoration has limited applicability even if it may
be applied to far more cases than restorative justice. This is because the public will not permit
its use in all cases, such as trials for murder, treason or serious sex offences. There is an
increasing amount of work that argues in favour of restorative justice in cases like these
(McGlynn 2011; Mills 2003). If punitive restoration improves public confidence in the
punishment for most, if not all, crimes, then it represents a compelling alternative demanding
greater engagement. The evidence already noted may be indicative, but it represents
encouraging support for such policies that appear likely to grow as further studies are
performed.
It might be further objected that stakeholder sentencing through punitive restoration
would fail to treat like cases alike. The concern is that offenders convicted of similar crimes
might receive different penal outcomes. If similar cases have different outcomes, then penal
justice may be undermined. This objection can be met because stakeholder sentencing is
about determining outcomes that better address the needs of stakeholders. There will be
differences between similar cases that the restorative conference setting can discover and
better target through the greater flexibility available to it. Alternatives appear more consistent
at the high price of their inability to address offender needs, for example, with the outcome
flexibility of punitive restoration.
Much of my argument for stakeholder sentencing above is that it is compelling
because it is an improvement over alternatives. Stakeholder sentencing is also a more
powerful view about the justice of punishment. So this model offers not only a compelling
way to better incorporate public opinion into sentencing decisions, but also a more
compelling view about justice addressing issues of both theory and practice. Thus,
stakeholder sentencing may overcome concerns that misinformed public opinion is driving
criminal justice policy (Page and Shapiro 1983). Stakeholder sentencing develops an
important revision of restorative justice through the restorative conference model that extends
its applicability and flexibility of outcomes in a way that is likely to improve public
confidence, reduce reoffending and be cost-effective.
Stakeholder sentencing also represents a compelling view about penal justice.
Punishment is often justified through its justifying aim or purpose, such as retribution,
deterrence or rehabilitation. Philosophers have long disagreed on which principle of
sentencing is best although there is general agreement that hybrid theories aiming to endorse
two or more principles often suffer from inconsistency (see Brooks 2012a: 89-100).
Stakeholder sentencing is one form that a unified theory of punishment might take because it
is able to pursue multiple penal goals within a unified and coherent account.24 For example,
24 There are several ways such a theory might be constructed, but the one I have
favoured is to view crime as a harm to individual rights and punishment as ‘a response’ to
crime with the purpose of the protection and maintenance of rights protected by the criminal
law. This model rejects the view that penalties and hard treatment have different justificatory
foundations, but rather penal outcomes share a common source of justification: the protection
of rights (see Feinberg 1970). The model is then able to address the fact that penal outcomes
are often multidimensional and include punitive and financial elements. The idea that those
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desert is satisfied because offenders must accept guilt prior to participation. The penal goals
of crime reduction (including the goal of protecting the general public) and enabling offender
rehabilitation are achieved through the restorative conference from the available evidence on
restorative justice outcomes. Restoration is secured through the high satisfaction of
participants in restorative conferences, including both victims and offenders. Stakeholder
sentencing, as a unified theory of punishment, need not prioritize one penal goal over others,
but it may facilitate the pursuit of several goals together. It must be emphasized that the
pursuit of these goals transpires within an overall restorative framework that helps avoid
conflict between principles.
Conclusion 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in securing a greater incorporation of public
opinion in sentencing decisions. This effort is thought to help produce improved public
confidence about penal outcomes. This development has alarmed some because of the fear
that a greater role for the public’s collective voice will lead to disproportionate and overly
harsh punishment. While it has been clear that public confidence in the criminal justice
system is important to secure and sustain, it is much less clear how this might be achieved
without sacrificing important penal principles and the rule of law.
I have argued that this problem of the public may be addressed through stakeholder
sentencing. The central idea is that sentencing decisions should be made collectively by those
who have a stake in penal outcomes. This model supports a greater incorporation of public
opinion within specified parameters that avoid the concerns flagged by critics. Stakeholder
sentencing sheds light on one way that public confidence might be secured without
undermining the legitimacy of sentencing decisions. This approach is a revised and expanded
account of restorative justice in what I have called punitive restoration. 
The ideas of stakeholder sentencing and punitive restoration represent an important
model for how we might bring the victim and others with a stake in penal outcomes back into
the criminal justice system. Nils Christie rightly says: ‘The victim is a particularly heavy loser
. . . Not only has he suffered, lost materially or become hurt, physically or otherwise . . . But
above all he has lost participation in his own case’ (1998: 314). Stakeholder sentencing helps
correct this unjust imbalance. 
If we wish to incorporate a greater voice for the public without sacrificing judicial
standards, then the idea of stakeholder sentencing deserves greater attention.25
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